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 Data Security and 
Tort Liability 
 By Vincent R. Johnson 
 Numerous lawsuits have recently been filed against data possessors (such as banks and universities) by data sub-jects (such as customers and alumni) seeking damages for harm caused by breaches of data security. 1 Some of 
these claims have been successful. Courts have held, for 
example, that a union has a duty to safeguard its members’ 
information 2 and have imposed liability for improper dis-
posal of educational records. 3 However, other claims have 
failed. 4 
 Whether and to what extent courts hold database 
possessors liable for damages caused by improper data 
access are questions of huge importance. Unless courts 
impose some form of liability, the persons often in the 
best position to prevent the losses caused by identity 
theft may have insufficient incentive to exercise care to 
avoid unnecessary harm. However, if liability is too read-
ily assessed, it may bankrupt valuable enterprises because 
of the vast numbers of potential plaintiffs and extensive 
resulting damages. 
 Despite the recent enactment of security breach noti-
fication statutes in 35 states, 5 the law governing database 
possessor liability is unsettled. In considering this field of 
tort law, it is useful to differentiate three questions. The 
first issue is whether database possessors have a legal duty 
to safeguard data subjects’ personal information from 
unauthorized access by hackers or others. Such obligations 
may be imposed by statutes, ordinary tort principles, or 
fiduciary duty law. The second issue concerns not whether 
there is a duty to protect computerized information from 
intruders, but whether a database possessor has a legal 
obligation to disclose evidence of a security breach to data 
subjects once an intrusion occurs. The third issue is how 
far liability should extend when the database possessor 
has failed to exercise reasonable care to protect data or to 
disclose information about an intrusion. 
 STATUTORY DUTIES TO 
PROTECT DATA 
 A statute may impose a duty to exercise care to 
protect data from intruders. An important example is 
California’s Security Breach Information Act (SBIA). 6 
The SBIA has served as a model for legislation subse-
quently adopted in numerous other jurisdictions. Mutual 
concerns animate the various state laws, which often share 
a common language and structure. However, the statutes 
sometimes differ in important respects. One key difference 
concerns whether a breach of the duties imposed by the 
act is expressly actionable in a private lawsuit. 
 The California SBIA imposes a data protection obli-
gation and expressly authorizes maintenance of a suit for 
damages caused by a breach of that duty. The relevant 
language, which became effective July 1, 2003, states: 
“A business that owns or licenses personal information 
about a California resident shall implement and maintain 
reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate 
to the nature of the information, to protect the personal 
information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, 
modification, or disclosure.” 7 The legislation further pro-
vides that “Any customer injured by a violation of this 
title may institute a civil action to recover damages.” 8 
 The SBIA leaves no doubt that businesses owe a 
duty under California law to protect customers’ personal 
information and that customers may recover damages if 
businesses breach that duty. The civil actions that the 
California legislature has instructed the courts to entertain 
are rooted in principles of negligence. Only unreasonable 
( i.e. , negligent) conduct violates the California SBIA. 
However, beyond offering clear guidance regarding the 
existence of duty and the liability regime, the SBIA leaves 
many matters unsettled. The SBIA makes no attempt to 
define what constitutes “reasonable security procedures 
and practices.” More importantly, the SBIA gives no indi-
cation as to what types of damages plaintiffs can recover. 
 In some states security breach notification laws 
require database possessors to protect personal informa-
tion from unauthorized access but make no provision for 
civil liability. 9 Many of those laws nevertheless leave room 
for judicial recognition of a civil cause of action. Under a 
traditional negligence  per se analysis, a court may, in its 
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discretion, embrace a statute not expressly providing for a 
civil cause of action as the standard of care for a tort suit. 
If the legislature intended the enactment to protect the 
class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member from 
the type of harm that occurred, a court may determine 
that violation of the statute defines the appropriate terms 
for imposing civil liability. 10 Many state laws satisfy these 
requirements. However, in some cases, the language of a 
statute suggests that the legislation should not be deemed 
to set the standard of care. 
 For example, the Arkansas Personal Information 
Protection Act, 11 which provides for enforcement by the 
attorney general, states that it “does not relieve a person 
or business from a duty to comply with any other require-
ments of other state and federal law regarding the protec-
tion and privacy of personal information.” 12 The absence 
of any provision for private enforcement and the second 
usage of the word “other” seem to suggest that a court 
should not embrace the security breach notification law, 
by itself, as the basis for a civil cause of action. 
 Similarly, it is difficult to envision that the Texas 
security breach statute 13 could be a predicate for a neg-
ligence  per se claim. Unlike the California SBIA, the 
Texas act does not create a civil cause of action against a 
database possessor that fails to exercise reasonable care. In 
addition, the act expressly provides for a deceptive trade 
practices action against hackers and others who “obtain, 
possess, transfer, or use [the] personal identifying infor-
mation of another” without authorization. 14 It would be 
reasonable to interpret the Texas statute as an expression 
that civil liability should extend only to hackers and other 
unauthorized persons and not to database possessors. 
 COMMON LAW DUTIES TO 
PROTECT DATA 
 Aside from statutes, common law principles sup-
port judicial recognition of a database possessor’s duty to 
safeguard information from intruders. Two landmark cases 
offer guidance:  Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co . 15 and 
 Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp . 16 
 In  Palsgraf , Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo set down 
the basic rule on duty for the New York Court of Appeals: 
“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to 
be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or 
to others within the range of apprehension.” 17 In  Palsgraf , 
nothing in the appearance of a newspaper-wrapped pack-
age carried by a man trying to board a moving train gave 
notice that the parcel contained explosives. Therefore, 
nothing warned the trainmen that Helen Palsgraf, a 
patron waiting across the platform, was in danger. There 
was as to her no “risk reasonably to be perceived” and 
thus no “duty to be obeyed.” As she was concerned, the 
railroad had no legal obligation not to carelessly dislodge 
the package while trying to assist the man who was run-
ning for the train. 
 Courts today continue to apply the  Palsgraf duty rule. 
Thus, it is useful to ask whether, from the standpoint of 
database possessors, there is a “risk reasonably to be per-
ceived” to data subjects if data is not protected from unau-
thorized intrusion. Obviously, in many situations (such 
as when hackers can access data via the Internet), the 
answer is yes. At least on its face, the basic rule in  Palsgraf 
suggests that database possessors should often have a duty 
to exercise reasonable care to protect data from intruders. 
 Palsgraf did not involve the threat of criminal inter-
vention, but  Kline did. In  Kline , a landlord was on notice 
that “an increasing number of assaults, larcenies, and 
robberies [were] being perpetrated against the tenants in 
and from the common” areas of a large apartment build-
ing. 18 In holding the landlord responsible for a subsequent 
attack on the plaintiff, the court said that a landlord is by 
no “means an insurer of the safety of his tenants” and is 
not obliged “to provide protection commonly owed by a 
municipal police department.” 19 However, a landlord is 
under a duty to take such precautions as “are within his 
power and capacity to take” in order to prevent harm by 
criminal intruders. 20 In writing for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, Judge Malcolm Richard Wilkey emphasized the 
fact that the landlord was the only party in a position to 
secure the common areas: 
 No individual tenant had it within his power to 
take measures to guard the garage entranceways, to 
provide scrutiny at the main entrance of the build-
ing, to patrol the common hallways and elevators, 
to set up any kind of a security alarm system in the 
building, to provide additional locking devices on 
the main doors, to provide a system of announce-
ment for authorized visitors only, to close the garage 
doors at appropriate hours, and to see that the 
entrance was manned at all times. 21 
 The court added: 
 The landlord is entirely justified in passing on the 
cost of increased protective measures to his tenants, 
but the rationale of compelling the landlord to do it 
in the first place is that he is the only one who is in 
a position to take the necessary protective measures 
for overall protection of the premises . . . .  22 
 A similar analysis is equally applicable to cases 
involving database security. Individual data subjects are 
in a poor position to protect database information from 
intruders. The database possessor, in contrast, is the only 
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one with the ability to mitigate the risk that intruders may 
cause harm. As in  Kline , the database possessor can spread 
the cost of providing database security to a broader class of 
data subjects, at least when there is customer relationship 
between the plaintiff and defendant.  Kline , like  Palsgraf , 
suggests that, at least in some circumstances, database 
 possessors should owe data subjects a duty to exercise 
 reasonable care to protect data from intruders. 
 In both  Palsgraf and  Kline , there was a relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant.  Palsgraf was a 
ticket purchaser of the defendant railroad;  Kline was a ten-
ant of the defendant corporation. Those relational ties are 
important, for other cases teach that duty often depends 
upon more than foreseeability of harm and opportunity 
to take precautions; it depends, sometimes, on a special 
linkage between the party who owes the duty and the 
one who receives its benefit. In this regard, recent cases 
involving allegedly negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud are instructive. 
 In  Huggins v. Citibank, N.A. , 23 for example, the plain-
tiff sued various banks on the ground that they “negligently 
issued credit cards” in the plaintiff ’s name to an “unknown 
imposter.” The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that 
the banks issued “credit cards without any investigation, 
verification, or corroboration” of the applicant’s identity. 
In response, “the [b]anks asserted they owed no duty to 
[the plaintiff] because he was not their customer.” The 
court agreed with the defendants and wrote: 
 In order for negligence liability to attach, the par-
ties must have a relationship recognized by law as 
the foundation of a duty of care. In the absence of 
a duty to prevent an injury, foreseeability of that 
injury is an insufficient basis on which to rest liabil-
ity. . . . The relationship, if any, between credit card 
issuers and potential victims of identity theft is far 
too attenuated to rise to the level of a duty between 
them. 24 
 Other courts have reached similar conclusions. 25 
 Together,  Palsgraf ,  Kline , and  Huggins indicate that 
the strongest cases for imposing a common law duty to 
guard data from intruders will be those in which there is a 
business relationship between the defendant database pos-
sessor and the plaintiff data subject. This conclusion makes 
sense on economic as well as doctrinal grounds. Imposing a 
duty of care in these cases will force the database possessor, 
which benefits from the use of computerized information, 
to internalize losses relating to improperly accessed data 
as a cost of doing business. That duty will in turn create 
an incentive for database possessors to scrutinize whether 
their business methods are really worth the costs that they 
entail. At the same time, the imposition of a duty in a 
business context gives the database possessor a means for 
distributing the loss by adjusting the price of the goods or 
services that it sells to the class of persons that ultimately 
benefits from the defendant’s business methods. That real-
location of losses will help ensure that the costs relating to 
improperly accessed data will not fall with crushing weight 
on either the data subject or the database possessor. 
 Placing a burden on database possessors to protect 
data from unauthorized access would tend to reduce 
intruder-related losses by encouraging investment in data-
base security. That investment would be consistent with 
the possessors’ own interests because unauthorized access 
entails huge costs, in terms of public relations and other-
wise, for those who maintain databases.  
 VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF A 
DUTY TO PROTECT DATA 
 Even if courts decline to impose a tort duty to safe-
guard data on database possessors generally (or at least on 
businesses), voluntary-assumption-of-duty principles may 
create a legally enforceable data-protection obligation. 26 A 
person not otherwise under a duty to exercise reasonable 
care may voluntarily assume the responsibility to do so. 
One way of assuming this duty is by promising to exer-
cise care and thereby inducing detrimental reliance. 27 
Another way is by “undertak[ing] to render services” and 
consequently increasing the risk of harm to the plaintiff. 28 
Either way, the party that undertook the duty of reason-
able care will be subject to liability if it breaches the vol-
untarily assumed duty and causes damages. 
 These well-established principles may apply when 
consumers reveal personal information to financial insti-
tutions in reliance on financial institutions’ stated privacy 
policies. For example, the policy of one major banking 
institution, which is not atypical, states in reassuring 
terms: 
 The law gives you certain privacy rights. Bank of 
America gives you more. . . . Keeping financial 
information secure is one of our most important 
responsibilities. We maintain physical, electronic 
and procedural safeguards to protect Customer 
Information. . . . All companies that act on our 
behalf are contractually obligated to keep the infor-
mation we provide to them confidential . . . . 29 
 A customer reading this information would conclude, 
at a minimum, that in exchange for entrusting the bank 
with personal information, the bank agreed (1) to protect 
the data by means of physical, electronic, and procedural 
safeguards and (2) to keep it confidential. Other language 
in the privacy policy reinforces those sensible conclusions 
by stressing the importance of precautions on the part of 
the customer to guard against disclosure or unauthorized 
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use of account and personal information. The same is true 
of statements in the bank’s advertising and on its Web 
site emphasizing the dangers of identity theft and assuring 
the customer that “[y]our checking account statements 
are always protected in Online Banking.” 30 A court might 
reasonably interpret such a privacy policy as an undertak-
ing to exercise reasonable care and might conclude that a 
breach of that duty would support a tort cause of action. 
 Similarly, even if the plaintiff never read or relied 
on the institution’s privacy policy, a court might impose 
a duty of care under the other prong of the undertaking 
rule, which says that, when services provided for the pro-
tection of another increase the risk of harm “beyond that 
which existed without the undertaking,” there is a duty 
to exercise reasonable care. 31 Depending on the facts, the 
measures taken to protect computerized data ( e.g. , use of 
passwords and firewalls) may contain flaws that increase 
the risk of unauthorized data access. An increased risk 
of harm might also result when data protection practices 
allow transmission of unencrypted data, which is  especially 
vulnerable to hacking. 
 FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS TO 
PROTECT DATA 
 If a database possessor owes fiduciary obligations to 
a data subject, it is reasonable to argue that regardless of 
whether general tort principles would impose a duty, the 
fiduciary is obliged to protect computerized information 
relating to the data subject from unauthorized access 
by third parties. For example, the relationship between 
an attorney and client is fiduciary as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, lawyers have a special obligation to protect 
confidential client information, aside from any demands 
imposed by ordinary tort principles. A lawyer’s broad 
fiduciary obligation of confidentiality extends to all forms 
of information about the client, including computerized 
data, 32 for the existence of the duty turns on the content, 
not the form, of the information. In light of the fiduciary-
duty rules on confidentiality (and the related obligations 
requiring safekeeping of client property), a lawyer or law 
firm could not plausibly argue that there is no duty to 
safeguard computerized client data from intruders. Indeed, 
the duty of safekeeping may even impose an obligation to 
encrypt sensitive information. 33 
 The same analysis should apply to all fiduciary 
relationships. 34 However, ordinary business relationships 
are not fiduciary. In business, parties normally deal with 
one another at arm’s length. The “mere acceptance of 
confidential information” does not create a fiduciary 
relationship, 35 nor does the fact that one party “trusts 
another and relies on a promise to carry out a contract.” 36 
Consequently, while fiduciary-duty law may play an 
important role in determining whether professionals, such 
as lawyers, physicians, or trustees, have a duty to protect 
the information of clients, patients, and beneficiaries from 
intruders, it will not set the standard of care in most com-
mercial settings. 
 STATUTORY DUTIES TO REVEAL 
SECURITY BREACHES 
 There are at least four ways of imposing on potential 
defendants a duty to reveal a compromise in database 
security. First, a statute may impose a duty, either as a 
result of the statute’s express terms or as a result of judicial 
reliance on the statute as the proper expression of the 
standard of care. Second, a duty may arise from common 
law principles governing negligence liability generally. 
Third, there may be a duty under the law of misrepresen-
tation, which imposes a general duty to update previously 
accurate statements ( e.g. , statements relating to data secu-
rity) that are the basis for pending or continuing reliance 
by the recipient of the statements. Finally, failure-to-act 
rules may require the exercise of reasonable care to avoid 
or minimize damages if a database possessor’s conduct 
 created a continuing risk of physical harm. 
 Many state security breach information acts require 
certain types of database possessors (typically businesses, 
but sometimes governmental agencies or other persons or 
entities, such as non-profit organizations) to notify data 
subjects of violations (or possible violations) of their 
information’s security. Several of the states that impose 
notification obligations expressly authorize a civil action 
for damages. 37 In addition, Illinois allows a deceptive 
trade practices action, 38 which permits a “person who suf-
fers actual damage . . . [to recover] actual economic dam-
ages or any other relief which the court deems proper,” 39 
including “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” 40 In 
other states, a variety of means are used to enforce the 
notification obligation, such as administrative or civil 
fines or an action by the attorney general to recover 
“direct economic damages” or to remedy deceptive trade 
practices. 
 Some state notification statutes not expressly provid-
ing for civil liability, such as the Maine Notice of Risk to 
Personal Data Act, 41 leave room for courts to entertain 
negligence  per se actions by ruling out arguments that 
legislatures intended the statutorily created penalties to 
be the sole measure of a database possessor’s obligations. 
The Maine law states that “rights and remedies available 
under [the statute] are cumulative and do not affect or 
prevent rights and remedies available under federal or 
state law.” 42 
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 COMMON LAW DUTIES TO REVEAL 
SECURITY BREACHES 
 A key question in determining whether common law 
principles should require notification is whether disclosure 
of the breach would be useful or futile. If a data subject 
could not do anything to protect his or her own interests 
following an intrusion into data security, there would be 
little reason to require notification. However, individuals 
can act to protect themselves from financial and physi-
cal harm that persons with unauthorized access to their 
data may cause. The federal Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) 43 allows consumers 
to place a “fraud alert” in their files with credit report-
ing agencies. Certain state laws also enable consumers to 
place a “security freeze” on their credit report, which “pro-
hibits the consumer reporting agency from releasing the 
consumer’s credit report or any information from it with-
out the express authorization of the consumer.” 44 Some 
state laws permit victims of information security breaches 
to obtain a court order declaring the individual a victim of 
identity theft. 45 That declaration can aid the data subject 
in dealing with law enforcement authorities or with busi-
nesses. Consumers can also monitor their credit card and 
bank accounts more closely for evidence of unauthorized 
transactions or pay monthly service fees to a company that 
tracks three national credit reporting companies on a daily 
basis and advises subscribers of key changes to their data 
(such as new applications for credit by someone using the 
subscriber’s name and identity). 
 In many circumstances, US tort law has imposed 
liability for failure to warn. Indeed, courts have sometimes 
held that there is a duty to warn even when there is no 
duty to do anything else. Consequently, it might reason-
ably follow that, even if a state holds that there is no duty 
to protect databases from intrusion, there should at least 
be a duty to provide notice of a security breach of the 
database. 
 There is a duty to update previous statements that 
were intended to induce reliance and that, though true 
when made, have become false or misleading as a result 
of subsequent developments. 46 The duty extends until 
recipients of the information are no longer able to protect 
their own interests by foregoing reliance on the now-
erroneous representation of the fact. Thus, if businesses 
tell their customers, through advertisements, Web sites, 
or published privacy policies, that their personal data is 
secure, but then learn information to the contrary, the 
businesses may have a duty to disclose those developments 
to their customers. The customers have a choice whether 
to continue their relationships with the businesses in 
question. There has been no irrevocable reliance by a 
customer, even though a business-customer relationship 
is already in progress. The customers may act to protect 
their interests by terminating the relationship and doing 
business elsewhere. 
 It is also well established that when a person’s prior 
conduct creates a continuing risk of physical harm there is 
a duty to render assistance to keep the harm from occur-
ring or mitigate adverse consequences. 47 This duty exists 
even if the prior conduct was not tortious. Thus, a driver 
who is involved in an auto accident must stop to render 
aid, regardless of whether he was at fault for the collision. 48 
The harm caused by intrusions into computerized personal 
data is typically more economic than physical in nature. 
Yet, misuse of improperly accessed personal data can result 
in a physical attack on a data subject or physical harm to 
property. Hacking of a newspaper’s records, for example, 
may reveal when a customer’s paper will be on vacation 
hold and thereby lead to a burglary while the customer 
is away on vacation. Thus, on appropriate facts, this rule 
may impose a duty to disclose information about a data 
security breach. 
 Finally, a fiduciary relationship imposes a duty of 
candor. The fiduciary must exercise reasonable care to 
reveal all material information to the person to whom 
the fiduciary owes a duty. Indeed, when the interests of 
the fiduciary and the beneficiary are adversely aligned, 
fiduciary principles may require something more than 
reasonable care, perhaps a degree of forthcomingness that 
approximates “absolute and perfect candor.” 49 If a data-
base possessor owes fiduciary obligations to a data subject 
(as in the case of an attorney and client), the possessor 
must disclose information relating to a breach of database 
security. The interests of the fiduciary and the data subject 
are in potential conflict because there are important ques-
tions as to whether the possessor may be held responsible 
for the loss of the data. The law requires the fiduciary to 
subordinate personal interests to the interests of the data 
subject. Non-disclosure would ordinarily be inconsistent 
with those heavy obligations.  
 THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 
 The economic-loss rule is an obscure, but important, 
legal doctrine, which holds that a plaintiff may not recover 
economic losses resulting from the defendant’s negligence 
without corresponding physical damage to the plaintiff ’s 
person or property. Obviously, if the economic-loss rule 
applies to cybersecurity cases, it has the potential to great-
ly limit the scope of recoverable damages. Consequently, 
it is important to understand the policies underlying the 
rule and the nature of its restrictions. Viewed from the 
standpoint of public policy, the economic-loss rule serves 
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three different functions: avoidance of too broad a scope 
of liability; insistence that damages be proved with cer-
tainty; and definition of the doctrinal boundary between 
contract law and torts. 
 First, somewhat crudely, the economic-loss rule pro-
tects potential defendants from the risk of a dispropor-
tionately wide range of liability. 50 This is an important 
function, for acts of negligence often have broad adverse 
economic consequences. Without this protection, there 
would be no sensible stopping point to tort liability. 
For example, a referee who negligently made a bad call 
that eliminated a team from the playoffs could be liable 
for the lost profits of merchants who sell team-related 
items, or a person who caused an auto accident could be 
responsible for the economic losses that resulted from the 
delays of persons tied up in traffic. Not surprisingly, the 
Restatement provides, as a general rule, that there is no 
liability for negligent interference with contracts or eco-
nomically promising relations. 51 
 Second, lost economic opportunities are often not 
readily susceptible to precise calculation. 52 Yet, the law 
insists that damages must be proved with reasonable 
certainty. By ruling out litigation in a huge range of cases 
(suits involving no personal injury or property damage), 
the economic-loss rule helps to ensure (again somewhat 
crudely) that compensation is not awarded for amounts 
that are speculative. In the process, the economic-loss 
rule promotes judicious use of limited judicial resources, 
ensuring that those scarce assets are not squandered on 
the burdensome, and perhaps dubious, task of trying to 
quantify endless economic losses that may, in truth, not 
be provable with reasonable precision. 
 Third and most importantly, the economic-loss rule 
marks the boundary between contract law and tort law. 
Delineating these two bodies of law is vital, for otherwise 
there is a risk that “contract law would drown in a sea of 
tort.” 53 The law of contracts has meaning only because 
entering into an agreement has legal consequences. One 
of those consequences is that, if a person makes a bad 
deal, he usually must suffer the result. This reality creates 
an incentive for contracting parties to exercise diligence 
to protect their own interests. It would render superfluous 
a great part of contract law if parties who strike disadvan-
tageous bargains could successfully complain that they 
should recover damages because the other side failed to 
exercise reasonable care to protect their interests. 
 With these three policy considerations in mind—
scope of liability, certainty of damages, and delineation 
of the boundary between contract law and torts—the 
questions are whether the economic-loss rule should apply 
to cybersecurity cases, and if so, what claims for damages 
the rule might bar. Answering those questions involves 
 consideration of the types of economic losses that may 
arise in these cases, as well as the efficacy of contract 
law and the insurance market in addressing such losses. 
Unauthorized use of personal information can result in 
many types of harm. In cybersecurity cases where breaches 
of security result in identity theft, the losses include, but 
are not limited to: (1) out-of-pocket expenses incurred to 
restore a good credit rating; (2) personal time spent on 
that task; and (3) lost opportunities resulting from bad 
credit. 
 Focusing first on out-of-pocket losses, there is little 
policy justification for denying recovery. Various estimates 
currently peg out-of-pocket costs in a typical case between 
$800 and $1,400. Although the amount of out-of-pocket 
damages may vary, this element of damages is susceptible 
to proof with a high degree of certainty. The plaintiff can 
gather receipts, make a list, and total the sum. There is 
no reason to deny compensation for amounts actually and 
reasonably spent on restoring a good credit rating on the 
ground that out-of-pocket damages are speculative. 
 Nor does recovery of out-of-pocket costs present a 
case that requires a tightly circumscribed circle of liability 
to prevent an over extension of legal responsibility. In 
many cases, there will be a business relationship between 
the database possessor and the damaged data subject, and 
in other cases the relationship (presumably) is sufficiently 
close enough that the defendant had some legitimate 
reason to maintain a database containing personal infor-
mation about the plaintiff. These are not situations where 
some stranger in the community ( e.g. , the vendor of the 
losing team’s products or the person tied up in traffic) is 
seeking to recover damages. If a database possessor wishes 
to constrict the scope of potential liability, it can always 
do so by removing the personal information of data sub-
jects from its database. But if it fails to do so, courts should 
be reluctant to deny recovery of out-of-pocket losses to 
data subjects. The database possessor chose to maintain 
personal information in a form where one of the risks was 
unauthorized access. 
 If the scope of liability and uncertainty of damages 
are not significant considerations, the only question is 
whether the boundary between contracts and torts is a 
good reason for a court to say that this type of loss should 
be compensated only if a contractual obligation exists. 
The answer to that question is no. 
 An emerging consensus, reflected in the recently 
passed state security breach notification statutes, suggests 
that rights relating to protection of personal data and 
notification of security breaches are not proper subjects for 
bargaining between the parties. Many state laws, such as 
the Rhode Island Identity Theft Protection Act of 2005, 54 
provide that a waiver of a data subject’s rights is against 
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public policy and therefore void and unenforceable. If that 
is true, it makes little sense that consumers should bargain 
and pay for the level of cybersecurity protection—and 
the right to sue for out-of-pocket damages—that they 
desire. Moreover, it is simply unrealistic to expect bar-
gaining to occur between individual consumers and the 
large corporations that play a pervasive role in modern 
life. Individuals often lack both the commercial leverage 
and the information necessary to assess the risks that they 
face. In light of the ubiquity of computerized databases, 
ordinary persons would have to devote a huge amount of 
energy to negotiating the parameters of data protection 
with every potential defendant if contract law were the 
only solution to these types of problems. 
 As an alternative to this sort of David-versus-an-army-
of-Goliaths contractual model, a better paradigm would 
routinely permit recovery of foreseeable and necessary out-
of-pocket losses from the tortfeasor. Compensation of out-
of-pocket losses should not depend on whether the data 
subject read the fine print in the defendant’s privacy policy 
or bargained for a specific level of protection. Instead, 
compensation should depend on the reasonableness of the 
amount spent to restore a good credit rating. Tort law can 
perform this function better than contract law. 
 A different analysis is required with respect to requests 
for recovery of compensation for time spent restoring one’s 
good credit or for opportunities lost as a result of a bad 
credit rating. Victims of identity theft spend 600 hours 
on average to restore their credit. The harm suffered by 
these victims is tremendous, but valuing these lost hours 
would be difficult. If damages amounted to compensation 
for the plaintiffs’ time measured at their usual hourly rates 
of earnings, the awards to professionals, minimum wage 
workers, and unemployed homemakers would vary widely. 
Similarly, if every victim received the same amount for the 
value of lost time, how would that amount be set? Ensuring 
uniformity in valuing damages for lost time is a task better 
committed to legislatures than to the multitude of fact-
finders who will preside over numerous tort claims. 
 The problems of compensating for the value of lost 
opportunities, such as the lost chance to buy a house, 
obtain a car loan, or open a cell phone account, are also 
obvious. How does one prove precisely which opportuni-
ties the plaintiff lost and what those opportunities meant 
in economic terms to the plaintiff? In addition, there is a 
clear risk of imposing an excessively wide range of liability. 
Negligence requires only a momentary misstep. To say 
that a negligent database possessor should be liable to a 
broad class of persons for all of their lost opportunities, as 
well as out-of-pocket and perhaps other damages, would 
quickly pose a serious risk of liability disproportionate to 
fault. These issues suggest that courts have a greater reason 
to apply the economic-loss rule to bar claims for lost time 
and lost opportunities than to hold that a plaintiff cannot 
recover out-of-pocket losses. 55 
 The economic-loss rule, as defined in most states, has 
important limits. First, it bars only claims for economic 
harm caused by negligence. 56 A plaintiff may thus be able 
to avoid the rule by proving more culpable conduct, such 
as recklessness or intentional wrong-doing. Second, the 
economic-loss rule is a common law doctrine that does 
not preempt legislative provisions to the contrary. Liability 
for negligently caused economic harm may be actionable 
pursuant to statute. At least one state, Illinois, expressly 
allows for recovery of economic losses in cybersecurity 
cases. 57 Third, many types of harm caused by intrusion 
are not purely economic. Thus, the rule does not bar 
recovery of damages for personal injury, property damage, 
and, perhaps, emotional distress. Fourth, some states show 
little enthusiasm for the economic-loss rule 58 and may 
determine that it does not apply to cybersecurity cases. 
Finally, virtually all states that embrace the economic-loss 
rule recognize exceptions. For example, economic damages 
are routinely recoverable in negligent misrepresentation 
actions. 59 Many states also allow persons whose legacies are 
lost due to negligent preparation of a will to sue to recover 
those economic damages. 60 A court might determine that 
the relationship between a database possessor and data 
subject is sufficiently special to warrant recovery of out-of-
pocket losses resulting from identity theft,  notwithstanding 
the economic-loss rule. 
 EMOTIONAL-DISTRESS DAMAGES 
 States differ tremendously over whether negligently 
caused emotional-distress claims are actionable. Some 
jurisdictions hold that emotional-distress damages are 
almost never recoverable, 61 but others seem quite will-
ing to entertain claims for psychic suffering caused by a 
tortfeasor’s failure to exercise due care. 
 One arena in which a consensus of sorts has emerged 
is the fear-of-disease cases. In these suits, the plaintiff 
alleges that the defendant’s tortious conduct subjected the 
plaintiff to emotional distress based on fear of contracting 
a contagious disease. Many of these cases have involved 
HIV or AIDS, but the precedent extends somewhat fur-
ther to fear of cancer and other diseases. In addressing 
these claims, courts generally hold that a plaintiff may 
recover emotional-distress damages only if the plaintiff 
was actually exposed to the disease. 62 Courts deem fear of 
disease in the absence of exposure to be unreasonable and 
therefore not compensable.  
 The precedent that has emerged in these cases pro-
vides a logical starting point for determining whether a 
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data subject should be able to recover for emotional-dis-
tress losses resulting from unauthorized database intrusion 
and fear of identity theft or other harm. If there is no 
evidence that an intruder actually accessed the plaintiff ’s 
data, and the evidence proves only a risk of unauthor-
ized access, courts ordinarily should deny emotional-dis-
tress damages, which are inherently difficult to quantify. 
However, some cases will warrant a presumption of unau-
thorized access. If the defendant has allowed or caused the 
best evidence of exposure to be lost or destroyed, courts 
reasonably may assume that exposure occurred absent 
proof to the contrary. Some fear-of-disease cases take this 
approach. 63 
 In cases involving intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, courts have assiduously required that the distress 
be severe before it is compensable. 64 This severity require-
ment is all the more applicable when the distress results 
from mere alleged negligence. Presumably, in only rare 
cases will it be possible for a data subject who does not 
suffer physical harm to recover emotional-distress damages 
relating to data intrusion. 65 
 CREDIT-MONITORING DAMAGES 
 Database possessors who suffer a security breach are 
often reluctant to discover and report those developments 
for fear of triggering adverse publicity, legal liability, or 
increased attacks by hackers. As a result, there can be an 
undesirable lag between the occurrence of an intrusion, 
discovery of that breach, and revelation of the events 
to data subjects. Yet, prompt revelation of a breach is 
important because it enables data subjects to protect their 
interests through increased vigilance against identity theft 
and other types of harm. 
 State security breach notification laws currently 
provide only a limited incentive for database possessors 
to discover intrusion because legislatures ordinarily base 
notification obligations on actual discovery or notification 
of the intrusion rather than when the database possessor 
should have discovered the breach. In addition, legisla-
tures typically impose a low cap on the civil fines that 
apply to a breach of a general statutory duty to protect 
customer information, which may provide insufficient 
inducement for best practices. 66 
 Legislatures should give database possessors a legal 
incentive to discover and report unauthorized database 
intrusions. That incentive could take the form of a limita-
tion on liability. One reasonable option would be to cap 
the database possessor’s exposure to liability at the moment 
that the database possessor reveals the breach to the data 
subject. Notification could serve as the pivotal factor in 
shifting further responsibility (beyond the  damages cap) 
from the database possessor to the data subject. Once the 
database possessor provides notice of the security breach, 
the data subject is in a better position than the database 
possessor to monitor the risk of harm and to take action 
against threats to the data subject’s credit and personal 
security. 
 The cap on damages could take the form of limiting 
liability to an amount equivalent to the out-of-pocket 
costs of monitoring credit ratings and taking other reason-
ably necessary steps to prevent identity theft and related 
losses. “Credit-monitoring damages” would be similar in 
concept to the medical monitoring damages that some 
state 67 and federal 68 courts allow victims of toxic exposure 
to recover. The analogy is apt. A data subject who loses 
personal data due to a security breach, like a person who 
suffers exposure to a toxic substance, is at risk of further 
harm. The harm ( e.g. , identity theft in the case of the 
data subject or cancer in the case of the toxic-exposure 
victim) may or may not later occur. However, the reason-
able and prudent course is to incur the expenses necessary 
to monitor the risk that harm may develop. The victim of 
the exposure is thereby in a better position to take prompt 
action; in one case, to combat the risk of financial harm 
from data misuse, and in the other to secure medical care 
to address the risk of developing an illness. 
 The bargain of capping a cybersecurity plaintiff ’s 
damages at the cost of monitoring credit if the database 
possessor provides notification of a security breach is not 
a bad one. From the standpoint of the data subject, the 
plaintiff may be better off with a warning and reimburse-
ment for the out-of-pocket costs of vigilance than gam-
bling on a tort action against the database possessor. A 
tort suit would be fraught with many obstacles: a possibly 
short statute of limitations; a risk that the court will not 
find the database possessor’s negligence to be a proximate 
cause of resulting criminal conduct; a likelihood that the 
economic-loss or exposure rules may bar key portions of 
the damages; and a possibility that the court might find 
that the database possessor had no duty at all. 
 Nor is the bargain bad for database possessors. 
Capping damages at the cost of credit monitoring would 
avoid the risk of catastrophic liability for personal injuries 
that sometimes occur, the possibility of exposure to prop-
erty-damage claims, and the chance that a court might 
narrowly construe the applicability of the economic-loss 
rule. Some companies faced with the risk of liability from 
loss of personal data have voluntarily provided affected 
persons with credit-monitoring protection. 69 However, 
courts have been reluctant to award credit monitoring 
damages. 70 
 Moreover, society would be better off if the law 
capped damages at the cost of credit monitoring in 
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exchange for victim notification whenever there is a 
security breach. The only ways to minimize the losses 
stemming from database intrusions (aside from criminal 
penalties, which seem ineffective) are to spur investment 
in data security, to discover when intrusions occur, and 
to warn persons whose interests are at risk. A cap on 
damages in exchange for notification of security breaches 
would not undercut the database possessors’ incentives 
to invest in data security. Database possessors would still 
be subject to state and federal laws that impose various 
sanctions relating to cybersecurity; they would still face 
the threats of bad publicity and consumer disaffection 
resulting from disclosure of security breaches; and at 
least some possessors ( e.g. , credit card companies) would 
still stand to lose millions of dollars as a result of unau-
thorized use of personal information. However, capping 
damages at credit-monitoring costs would help to ensure 
that database possessors are not subject to ruinous tort 
judgments. The cap would create incentives to discover 
security breaches and to internalize the resulting credit-
 monitoring costs that those intrusions entail. In addi-
tion, the cap on damages might also reduce the threat 
of overburdening already overworked federal and state 
courts. The cap would greatly simplify damages issues in 
cybersecurity cases and guidance from the courts would 
quickly define the average costs of security monitoring, 
thereby promoting the settlement of cases. Indeed, limit-
ing liability to security-monitoring damages is also likely 
to promote insurance coverage of intruder-related losses 
by making the extent of liability more certain, thereby 
facilitating the pricing of insurance coverage. 
 A damages cap should not apply to cases involv-
ing egregious conduct. A plaintiff who can establish 
that the defendant acted with reckless indifference or 
intentional disregard in failing to protect data should be 
able to avoid the limitation on liability. Similarly, if the 
defendant did not disclose a security breach, liability for 
a breach of the notification duty or of the duty to protect 
data should extend as far as the usual rules of tort law 
allow. 
 A cap on database possessor liability at the costs of 
credit-monitoring damages can be legislatively enacted. 
However, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, 
questions relating to duty, proximate causation (includ-
ing shifting responsibility), and damages have tradition-
ally been within the province of the courts. State law 
may permit courts to determine that, if a database pos-
sessor negligently fails to protect computerized personal 
information, the database possessor has no legal obliga-
tion other than to pay for credit-monitoring damages if 
the database possessor revealed the breach to the data 
subject. 
 SECURITY IN INSECURE TIMES 
 Modern society is built on fragile foundations of 
computerized personal data. If this society is to endure 
and prosper, then it must vigilantly safeguard those foun-
dations. Tort law offers an appropriate legal regime for 
allocating the risks and spreading the costs of database 
intrusion-related losses. Tort law can also create incen-
tives, on the part of both database possessors and data 
subjects, to minimize the harm associated with breaches 
of database security. Courts and legislatures must consider 
carefully the role of tort liability in protecting computer-
ized data. If those who make and interpret the laws too 
hastily conclude that database possessors are not liable for 
losses occasioned by unauthorized data access, whether 
because there is no duty, no proximate causation, or no 
recoverable damages, important opportunities to reduce 
and distribute the costs of computerized technology will 
be lost. If liability is too readily assessed, important institu-
tions will be adversely affected and with them the prosper-
ity of modern society. Security in insecure times requires a 
sensitive balancing of competing interests. Established tort 
principles carefully applied to the contemporary problems 
of cybersecurity and identity theft can perform a key role 
in protecting the economic foundations of modern life. 
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